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THE ATTACK-AND-DEFENSE GROUP CONTESTS: BEST SHOT VERSUS
WEAKEST LINK
SUBHASISH M. CHOWDHURY and IRYNA TOPOLYAN∗
This study analyzes a group contest in which one group (defenders) follows a weakest
link, whereas the other group (attackers) follows a best shot impact function (IF). We
fully characterize the Nash and coalition-proof equilibria and show that with symmetric
valuation the coalition-proof equilibrium is unique up to the permutation of the identity
of the active player in the attacker group. With asymmetric valuation, it is always an
equilibrium for one of the highest valuation players to be active; it may also be the case
that the highest valuation players in the attacker group free-ride completely on a group
member with a lower valuation. However, in any equilibrium, only one player in the
attacker group is active, whereas all the players in the defender group are active and
exert the same effort. We also characterize the Nash and coalition-proof equilibria for
the case in which one group follows either a best shot or a weakest link but the other
group follows an additive IF. (JEL C72, D70, D72, D74, H41)
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a situation in which a group of firms
is engaged in illegal price fixing. Their businesses
are spread over several countries and each of
them exerts irreversible resources on hiding their
activities and on legal experts to avoid possible
prosecution (Malik 1990). Antitrust authorities
in those countries (the Competition and Mar-
ket Authority in the United Kingdom, and the
antitrust division of the Department of Justice
in the United States, for example) also exert
costly resources on investigation to detect pos-
sible cartels. Thus, we can depict the antitrust
authorities as a group of “attackers” and the col-
luding firms as a group of “defenders.” For the
antitrust authorities, the efforts have the nature
of a “best shot,” that is, if any of the authori-
ties can detect the cartel, then it will solve the
problem for all others. Hence, essentially the best
effort exerted among the authorities represents
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the strength of the investigation. However, for the
colluding firms, the resources exerted have the
nature of a “weakest link,” that is, if one of
them gets detected, then the whole cartel will
be detected. Therefore, the lowest avoidance
effort determines the strength of hiding the col-
lusion.1
The above-mentioned situation can be struc-
tured as a group contest, in which members of
groups exert irreversible efforts that translate into
“group effort.” Then a group contest success
function (CSF; a function that maps the group
efforts into the probabilities of winning) deter-
mines which group is going to win. A func-
tion that translates the individual group member
efforts into a group effort is called an impact func-
tion (IF; Wärneryd 1998). In the case above, the
colluding firms follow a weakest link IF, and the
antitrust authorities follow a best shot IF.We term
this family of games the “Attack-and-Defense
Group Contest.”
1. In some particular circumstances, the strength of either
the attackers or the defenders can arguably be viewed also as
perfectly substitutable or additive in nature. We discuss them
in detail in Section 3.
ABBREVIATIONS
CES: Constant Elasticity of Substitution
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CSF: Contest Success Function
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
IF: Impact Function
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This type of structure is quite common in the
field. In addition to the case of avoidance efforts
in collusion discussed above, there are very many
situations in which groups are engaged in Attack-
and-Defense Contests. One prominent example
is from defense economics (Arce, Kovenock,
and Roberson 2012; Conybeare, Murdoch, and
Sandler 1994). The siege game between different
intelligence agencies and terrorist organizations
follows this structure. Intelligence agencies such
as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) trying to
stop terrorists follow a best shot IF, as if any of
them can capture or uncover a terrorist ploy, it
will solve the issue. However, terrorist organiza-
tions such as the Al-Quida or the Lashkar-e-Taiba
follow a weakest link IF, as if any of their
ploys get detected, then the terror links will
be exposed.2 Another example comes from the
system reliability (Hausken 2008; Varian 2004)
literature. A system of software operations fol-
lows a weakest link structure, as if one of them
is captured by viruses, then the whole system
will get infected. However, for virus coders, it
is a best shot situation, as if any of the viruses
gets in through the system, then it can infect
and capture the whole system. Furthermore, in
corrupt societies the members of a political party
exert efforts to conceal information regarding
corruption in the party, whereas members of the
civil society exert efforts to uncover it (OECD
2003). Understandably, the strength of the party
will be as strong as the weakest member, but
for the civil society any successful member will
bring in the required result for all.
Of course, this structure can also capture sit-
uations beyond the nature of attack and defense.
For example, a firm in a patent race may run par-
allel R&D teams, but another firm may run a big
R&D team that works sequentially by special-
ized team members (Abernathy and Rosenbloom
1968; Nelson 1961). Hence, the resultant R&D
of the first firm in the patent race will have the
nature of a best shot as the best product will
represent the firm. However, the resultant R&D
of the second firm will depend on the strength of
the weakest member.
Individual attack-and-defense game is
explored extensively in the literature. Clark
2. On the other hand, when the roles reverse, i.e., terrorist
groups attack a country, then any successful attack serves
their purposes and hence they follow a best shot technology.
However, the intelligence agencies now are in the defense
positions and they lose if any successful attack occurs. Hence
they follow a weakest link technology.
and Konrad (2007) analyze a game in which
multiple battlefields are linked and two players,
with limited resources, allocate the resources into
the battlefields. The resources allocated by both
players in a particular battlefield determine the
probability of a player to win the battlefield. One
player, the attacker, will have to win at least one
battlefield to win the game; but the other player,
the defender, will have to win every battlefield.
This type of structure is employed in other
studies (Arce, Kovenock, and Roberson 2012;
Hausken 2008; Kovenock and Roberson 2012)
and is generalized in a model by Kovenock
and Roberson (2010). Each of these studies,
however, analyzes individual conflict and does
not consider any group dynamics in this context.
The literature on group contests starts with
the work by Katz, Nitzan, and Rosenberg (1990)
who consider symmetric valuation and a lottery
(Tullock 1980) CSF with a perfectly substitute
(or additive) IF. Baik (2008) extends this to asym-
metric valuation and shows that only the highest
valuation player in a group exerts positive effort
in equilibrium, whereas other players free-ride.
Similar conclusions are derived by Baik (1993)
for the case of an additive IF and a CSF satisfying
certain general regularity conditions. Lee (2012)
employs the weakest link IF for all groups and
characterizes possible equilibria. He shows that
in any equilibrium all group members exert the
same effort. Multiple equilibria exist, but the
coalition-proof equilibrium is unique. Kolmar
and Rommeswinkel (2013) use a constant elas-
ticity of substitution IF (ranging from perfect
substitute to weakest link) and characterize the
set of equilibria. Chowdhury, Lee, and Sheremeta
(2013a) employ the best shot IF and show that
only one player in each active group exerts pos-
itive effort in equilibrium. However, the active
player need not be a highest valuation group
member. All these studies employ a stochastic
(lottery, à la Tullock 1980) CSF. Another stream
of research, instead, uses a deterministic (all-pay
auction, à laBaye, Kovenock, and de Vries 1996)
CSF. Among them, Baik, Kim, andNa (2001) and
Topolyan (2014) use additive; Chowdhury, Lee,
and Topolyan (2013b) use weakest link; Barbieri,
Malueg, and Topolyan (2014) use best shot; and
Chowdhury and Topolyan (2015) use hybrid IFs.
These studies make several important con-
tributions to the literature. However, none
except the last explore a situation in which dif-
ferent groups can follow different IFs. Table 1
summarizes the fit of the current study in this area
of literature. The columns in Table 1 show the IF,
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TABLE 1
Fit of the Current Study
CSF \ IF Best Shot Perfect Substitute Weakest Link
Stochastic (Tullock) Chowdhury, Lee, and Sheremeta
(2013a)
Katz, Nitzan, and Rosenberg
(1990) and Baik (2008)
Lee (2012)
Kolmar and Rommeswinkel (2013):
CES from perfect substitute to weakest link
Current study: Allows the possibility of different IFs for different groups
Deterministic (all-pay
auction)
Barbieri, Malueg, and Topolyan
(2014)
Baik, Kim, and Na (2001)
and Topolyan (2014)
Chowdhury, Lee, and
Topolyan (2013b)
Chowdhury and Topolyan (2015)
and the rows show the CSF implemented in the
group contests employed in each of the studies.
To summarize, in this study we make a three-
fold contribution. First, we provide a better
understanding of situations in which groups are
engaged in attack-and-defense conflicts. For
the first time in the literature, we introduce a
theoretical underpinning of attack-and-defense
contests in which groups, rather than individuals,
are involved. Second, we fill in a gap in the
group contest literature by providing contests
in which different groups follow different IFs.
Third, we consider the prize to have the nature of
group-specific public good (e.g., if the colluding
firms are not detected, then every firm benefits;
and if they are detected, then every antitrust
authority does). Hence, we also contribute to
the literature on collective action (Olson 1965)
and public-good games (Barbieri and Malueg
2008; Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986;
Bliss and Nalebuff 1984) with weakest link or
best shot network externalities (Cornes 1993;
Hirshleifer 1983, 1985).
II. THE MODEL
A. Model Set-Up
We structure the model along similar lines
to Chowdhury, Lee, and Sheremeta (2013a).
Consider a contest in which two groups compete
to win a group-specific public-good prize. Group
g consists of mg ≥ 2 risk-neutral players who
exert costly efforts to win the prize. The indi-
vidual group members’ valuation for the prize
may differ across groups; however, it is the same
within a group. Let vg > 0 represent the valuation
for the prize of any player in group g, and xgi ≥ 0,
measured in the same unit as the prize values,
represent the effort level exerted by player i in
group g.
Next, we specify the group IF as fg ∶ ℝ
mg
+ →
ℝ+, such that the group effort of group g is
given by Xg = fg(xg1, xg2, … , xgmg ). The follow-
ing assumptions define the best shot technology
for group 1 and the weakest link technology for
group 2.
ASSUMPTION 1. The group effort of group
1 is represented by the maximum effort level
exerted by the players in group 1, that is, X1 =
max
{
x11, x12, … , x1m1
}
.
ASSUMPTION 2. The group effort of group
2 is represented by the minimum effort level
exerted by the players in group 2, that is, X2 =
min
{
x21, x22, … , x2m2
}
.
To specify the winning probability of group
g, denote pg
(
X1, X2
)
∶ ℝ2+ → [0, 1] as a contest
success function (CSF). We assume a logit form
group CSF (Münster 2009).
ASSUMPTION 3. The probability of winning
the prize for group g is
pg
(
X1, X2
)
=
{
Xg∕
(
X1 + X2
)
if X1+X2 > 0
1∕2 if X1+X2 = 0.
We assume all players forgo their efforts and
they have a common cost function with unit
marginal cost as described by Assumption 4.
ASSUMPTION 4. The common cost function is
c(xgi)= xgi.
Only the members of the winning group
receive the prize. Let ugi represent the payoff for
player i in group g. Under the above assumptions,
the payoff for player i in group g is
(1) ugi = vgXg∕
(
X1 + X2
)
− xgi.
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Equation (1) along with the four assump-
tions represents the attack-and-defense group
contest. To close the structure, we assume that
all players in the contest choose their effort lev-
els independently and simultaneously, and that
all of the above (including the valuations, group
compositions, IFs, and the CSF) is common
knowledge. We employ Nash equilibrium as our
solution concept.
We use the following definitions throughout
the paper.
DEFINITION 1. If player i in group g exerts
strictly positive effort, that is, xgi > 0, then the
player is called active. Otherwise (when xgi = 0)
the player is called inactive.
DEFINITION 2. If the group effort of group g
is strictly positive, that is, Xg > 0, then group g is
called active. Otherwise (when Xg = 0) the group
is called inactive.
Let Ig (I−g) denote the index set of all
players in group g (other than g, respec-
tively), and 𝒫g denote the set of all nonempty
subsets of Ig. Given a strategy profile
x =
(
x11, … , x1m1 , x21, … , x2m2
)
and player
i∈ I− g, let x−gi represent the effort of player i in
group other than g.
DEFINITION 3. We say that a coalition of play-
ers C ∈ 𝒫g of group g blocks a strategy pro-
file x if there exists a strategy profile y such
that ugi(y)≥ ugi(x) for all i∈C, ugj(y)> ugj(x)
for some j∈C, x− gi = y− gi for all i∈ I− g, and
xgk = ygk for all k∉C.
In other words, a coalition of players blocks
a strategy profile if the members of the coalition
have an incentive to deviate altogether.
DEFINITION 4. A strategy profile x is called a
coalition-proof equilibrium if no coalition C ∈
𝒫g, g= 1, 2, blocks x.
It follows fromDefinition 4 that any coalition-
proof equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
B. Solution with Symmetric Valuation
We begin by stating Lemma 1. This lemma
points out (from Assumption 3) that both groups
actively participate in the contest.
LEMMA 1. In any equilibrium both groups are
active.
Assumption 1 gives rise to Lemma 2. This
result is analogous to Lemma 2 of Chowdhury,
Lee, and Sheremeta (2013a), and the proof fol-
lows similar lines.
LEMMA 2. In any equilibrium only one player
in group 1 is active.
The following result in Lemma 3 is analogous
to Lemma 1 of Lee (2012) and holds due to the
weakest link technology in group 2.
LEMMA 3. In any equilibrium all players of
group 2 are active and choose the same effort
level.
Lemmata 1, 2, and 3 simplify the group con-
test into a seemingly individual contest in which
each group behaves like an individual. Consider
a situation in which only player i of group 1 is
active and puts positive effort x1 (“attacks”) and
all players of group 2 “defend,” exerting the same
effort level x2. Note that because of the best shot
technology in group 1 and the weakest link tech-
nology in group 2, we have X1 = x1 and X2 = x2.
Equation (1) yields the following first-order con-
ditions for an interior Nash equilibrium.
(2) v1x2∕
(
x1 + x2
)2 = 1,
(3) v2x1∕
(
x1 + x2
)2
≥ 1.
Equation (2) results from the fact that the
active player of group 1 is competing individually
against group 2. Inequality (3) ensures that no
player in group 2 wants to decrease her effort
level (due to the weakest link technology no
player in group 2 wants to deviate to a higher
effort level). Equation (2) implies x1 =
√
v1x2 −
x2; plug this to (3) to obtain
x2 ≤
(
v1v
2
2
)
∕
(
v1 + v2
)2
≡ x2.
Therefore, there exists a continuum of Nash
equilibria such that only one player in group 1
exerts effort x1 =
√
v1x2 − x2 and every player in
group 2 exerts effort x2 ∈ (0, x2].
As the weakest effort determines the sur-
vival of the defenders, all members put forth
the same effort in a Nash equilibrium. However,
as the highest effort determines the success of
the attacking group, its members have an incen-
tive to free-ride—and in equilibrium only one of
the group members exerts effort while all oth-
ers free-ride on him. Note that although there
exists a continuum of Nash equilibria, there is
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a unique coalition-proof equilibrium where all
players in group 2 choose the highest effort level
x2. Theorem 1 summarizes this result.
Theorem 1. The attack-and-defense contest
with symmetric valuation has a unique coalition-
proof equilibrium (up to the permutation of
the identity of the active player in group 1),
where one player in group 1 exerts effort
x1 =
(
v21v2
)
∕
(
v1 + v2
)2
, every other player in
group 1 puts zero effort, and every player in
group 2 exerts effort x2 =
(
v1v
2
2
)
∕
(
v1 + v2
)2
.
There is a continuum of Nash equilibria such
that every player in group 2 exerts effort
0 < x2 ≤
(
v1v
2
2
)
∕
(
v1 + v2
)2
, one player in
group 1 exerts effort x1 =
√
v1x2 − x2, and all
other players in group 1 exert zero effort.
Observe that GM ≡
√
v1v2 and AM ≡ (v1 +
v2)/2 are the geometric and arithmetic means of
the valuations, respectively, and the GM −AM
ratio represents the relative dispersion in val-
uation. Remarkably, the equilibrium efforts of
active players are directly proportional to their
own valuation and (GM/AM)2. Thus, Theorem 1
implies that themore dispersed the valuations, the
greater the effort levels in the equilibria.3
C. Extension to Asymmetric Valuation
Assume now that the individual group mem-
bers’ valuation for the prize may differ within
and across groups. This asymmetry in values can
reflect player asymmetry, or an exogenous shar-
ing rule of the group-specific prize, in which the
prize-shares among the members of a group are
different. Also, note that if we relax Assump-
tion 4 and consider player asymmetry in marginal
costs then, due to risk neutrality, the model can
again be transformed into an asymmetric valua-
tion model after appropriate rescaling. Let vgi > 0
represent the valuation for the prize of player i
in group g. Without loss of generality, assume
vg(t− 1) ≥ vgt for 1< t≤mg.
Here we cannot apply the method we used
in the previous section to find Nash equilibria
because, given the heterogeneity of valuations in
the defender team, it is not clear which valuation
to use to derive the first-order conditions. We can,
however, simplify the game as follows. Assume
all players in group 2 choose the same effort
level (either in or off equilibrium). Clearly, no
3. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us to this
observation.
player wants to deviate to a higher effort due
to the weakest link technology. It may be the
case, however, that some player wants to exert a
lower effort. Thus, a strategy
(
x21, … , x2m2
)
is
a part of equilibrium if and only if x21 = x22 =
· · · = x2m2 = x2 and no player in group 2 wants
to deviate to some lower effort.
Clearly, only one player in group 1 is active
due to the best shot IF. Suppose one of the
highest valuation players (say, player 1) is active
and exerts effort x11. Due to the weakest link
technology, all players in group 2 exert the
same effort level x2. As in the previous section,
player 1 in group 1 is competing individually
against group 2, which yields the following
first-order condition.
(4) v11x2∕
(
x11 + x2
)2 = 1.
To ensure that no player in group 2 wants to
deviate, the following system of inequalities must
be satisfied.⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
v21x11∕
(
x11 + x2
)2
≥ 1
⋮
v2m2x11∕
(
x11 + x2
)2
≥ 1.
As the valuations are descending within the
group, this system is equivalent to
(5) v2m2x11∕
(
x11 + x2
)2
≥ 1.
Denote by xb1k the best response of player
k of group 1 under the condition that player
k puts the highest effort in her group. As
v11x2∕
(
xb11 + x2
)2 = 1 and the valuations are
descending, the first-order conditions for the
payoff maximization imply that xb11 ≥ x
b
1k for all
k> 1, which shows that when only player 1 in
group 1 is active, no other (inactive) player in
group 1 wants to deviate.
Hence Equations (4) and (5) characterize all
Nash equilibria in which one of the highest val-
uation players of group 1 is active. This system
of equations has a continuum of solutions which
are of the following form: x11 =
√
v11x2 − x2 and
x2 ∈ (0, x2], where
(6) x2 =
(
v11v
2
2m2
)
∕
(
v11 + v2m2
)2
.
We are now ready to characterize all Nash
equilibria for the case of asymmetric valuation.
Theorem 2. The Nash equilibria of the attack-
and-defense contest with asymmetric valuation
are as follows.
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There exists a continuum of Nash equilibria
such that all players in group 2 are active and
exert effort x2 ∈ (0, x2] while only one of the
highest valuation players in group 1 is active
and exerts effort x1 =
√
v11x2 − x2, where x2 =(
v11v
2
2m2
)
∕
(
v11 + v2m2
)2
.
If 4v1k ≥ v11 for some k such that v1k < v11,
then in addition there exists a continuum of
equilibria such that: all players in group 2 are
active and exert effort x2 ∈ (0, rk], where rk =
min
1≤j<k
sup
{
0≤ y≤ x2∶ 2
√
v1jv1k − v1j ≥
√
yv1k
}
,
x2 =
(
v1kv
2
2m2
)
∕
(
v1k + v2m2
)2
; player k in
group 1 is active and exerts effort x1k =
√
v1kx2
−x2; all other players in group 1 put no effort.
Proof. Let us investigate the possibility that the
highest valuation players free-ride on a player
with a lower valuation. Suppose only player k
(such that v1k < v11) in group 1 is active, then
he chooses effort level x1k =
√
v1kx2 − x2. There-
fore, an inactive player j earns payoff
πfree−ride1j =
(√
v1k −
√
x2
)
v1j∕
√
v1k.
Let us investigate whether player j has a prof-
itable deviation. As player j is trying to maxi-
mize her payoff, she would deviate, if at all, to an
effort level x1j such that x1j =
√
v1jx2 − x2, which
is implied by the corresponding first-order con-
dition. As v1(t− 1) ≥ v1t for 1< t≤mg, we have
x1(t− 1) ≥ x1t. Consequently, no player t in group
1 such that t> k has an incentive to deviate, for
player twill not be the best shot in her group if she
exerts effort level x1t. Fix player j< k who exerts
effort x1j =
√
v1jx2 − x2, then player j’s payoff is
πactive1j =
(√
v1j −
√
x2
)
v1j∕
√
v1j −
√
v1jx2 + x2.
Hence player j has no incentive to become
active if and only if πfree-ride1j ≥ π
active
1j , that is,(√
v1k −
√
x2
)
v1j∕
√
v1k
≥
(√
v1j −
√
x2
)
v1j∕
√
v1j −
√
v1jx2 + x2,
which is equivalent to
(7) 2
√
v1jv1k − v1j ≥
√
x2v1k.
Note that for any fixed v1k, the right-hand side
of Equation (7) approaches zero as x2→ 0. Thus,
condition (7) is satisfied for some x2 > 0 if and
only if 2
√
v1jv1k − v1j > 0, which is equivalent to
(8) 4v1k ≥ v1j.
Note also that if condition (7) holds for some
x2 = r, then it holds for all 0< x2 ≤ r. Fix player k
in group 1 such that v1k < v11, and for each player
j< k define
rjk = sup
{
0≤ y≤ x2∶ 2
√
v1jv1k−v1j ≥
√
yv1k
}
,
where x2 =
(
v1kv
2
2m2
)
∕
(
v1k + v2m2
)2
. By con-
vention we let sup{∅}=−∞. Next, define
(9) rk = min1≤j<k rjk.
By construction, rk > 0 if and only if 4v1k ≥ v1j
for all j< k, that is, 4v1k ≥ v11. ◽
Theorem 2 states that there always exist equi-
libria in which only one of the highest valuation
players in the attacker group is active. In addi-
tion, if the highest valuation is not too far from
the rest, the highest valuation players may com-
pletely free-ride on one of the lower valuation
players. Similarly to the case of symmetric val-
uations, equilibrium efforts of active players are
proportional to the dispersion of their valuations.
Finally, let us investigate the existence of
coalition-proof equilibria in which the highest
valuation players may be inactive. Suppose only
player k in group 1 is active (where v1k < v11),
then there is a unique candidate for the coalition-
proof equilibrium (x1j = 0 for all j≠ k).
(10) x1k =
(
v21kv2m2
)
∕
(
v1k + v2m2
)2
,
(11) x2 =
(
v1kv
2
2m2
)
∕
(
v1k + v2m2
)2
.
Consequently player j in group 1, who puts no
effort, earns payoff
πfree−ride1j =
v21kv2m2[
v21kv2m2 + v1kv
2
2m2
]v1j
=
v1k[
v1k + v2m2
]v1j.
As the valuations are descending within the
group, we again conclude that no player j> k
wants to become active. Fix player j< k; her best
option for a deviation is
x1j =
(
v21jv2m2
)
∕
(
v1j + v2m2
)2
,
in which case her payoff is
πactive1j =
v21jv2m2[
v21jv2m2 + v1jv
2
2m2
]v1j − v21jv2m2(
v1j + v2m2
)2 .
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Hence, player jwill free-ride on player k if and
only if πfree−ride1j ≥ π
active
1j , which is equivalent to
(12) v1k ≥ v
2
1j∕
(
v2m2 + v1j
)
.
Rewrite condition (12) as v1j(v1k − v1j)+ v2m2
v1k ≥ 0, from which it is evident (as v1j ≥ v1k)
that if condition (12) is satisfied for player 1 in
group 1, then it is satisfied for every j< k. Thus,
all players in group 1, except player k, are better
off exerting no effort if and only if
(13) v1k ≥ v
2
11∕
(
v2m2 + v11
)
.
Therefore, a coalition-proof equilibrium
where only player k in group 1 is active exists
if and only if condition (13) is satisfied; such
equilibrium is uniquely determined by Equations
(10) and (11). Note that there always exists a
coalition-proof equilibrium in which a highest
valuation player is active. If at least two players
in group 1 tie for the highest valuation, then the
coalition-proof equilibrium effort levels where a
highest valuation player in group 1 is active are
unique while any one of the highest valuation
players is active. These results are summarized
in Theorem 3. Figure 1 provides a diagram-
matic representation of the Nash and coalition-
proof equilibria.
Theorem 3. The coalition-proof equilibria of the
attack-and-defense contest with asymmetric val-
uation are as follows.
One of the highest valuation players in
group 1 is active and exerts effort x1 =(
v211v2m2
)
∕
(
v11 + v2m2
)2
, while every player
in group 2 exerts effort x2 =
(
v11v
2
2m2
)
∕(
v11 + v2m2
)2
.
If v1k ≥ v
2
11∕
(
v2m2 + v11
)
for some
k> 1, then, in addition, there exists a
coalition-proof equilibrium in which only
player k in group 1 is active and exerts
effort x1k =
(
v21kv2m2
)
∕
(
v1k + v2m2
)2
, while
every player in group 2 exerts effort
x2 =
(
v1kv
2
2m2
)
∕
(
v1k + v2m2
)2
.
The economic intuition that we provided in
Section 2.2 is similar for the case of asymmetric
valuations. The equilibrium effort of the active
player in group 1 is directly proportional to her
own valuation and the dispersion in valuation,
when the lowest valuation in group 2 is taken into
account. A similar conclusion holds for group 2.
Following Lee (2012) and Chowdhury, Lee,
and Sheremeta (2013a), we consider a 2× 2 case
FIGURE 1
Equilibria of the Attack-and-Defense Contest
in Figure 1, in which there are two group mem-
bers in the attacker group and two in the defender
group. The curved lines are the best response
functions and the shadowed area depicts the
equilibria specific to the defender group (due to
the weakest link technology). Hence, the inter-
section of the best response of the attacker group
and the shadowed area is the set of Nash equi-
libria. The dotted lines OC1 and OC2 represent
exactly that. When player i(=1, 2) is the active
player in the attacker group, then OCi shows the
set of Nash equilibria, and Ci turns out to be the
unique coalition-proof equilibrium.
III. CASES WITH AN ADDITIVE IF
It can be argued that the attack effort does not
necessarily need to follow a best shot function. To
be precise, it may be possible that the effort of one
member of the attacker group can add up to (or
substitute) another member’s effort. Examples of
this may be situations in which the attackers such
as the CIA or the FBI make mutually exclusive
geographical or jurisdictional restrictions. In
such a case the attacker group follows a perfectly
substitute IF. To incorporate this structure, we
retain all the other assumptions in the model the
same but replace Assumption 1 with
ASSUMPTION 1′. The group effort of group 1
is represented by the sum of effort levels exerted
by the players in group 1, that is, X1 =
∑m1
i=1 x1i.
Similar to the analyses above, all the players
in group 2 exert the same effort. Following
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Baik (2008), the equilibrium effort of group 1
is unique. Only the highest value player(s) in
group 1 exert positive effort, whereas all other
group members exert zero effort. If there is more
than one player with the highest valuation, then
the total equilibrium effort of group 1 can be
unambiguously determined, but not the individ-
ual efforts. This is summarized in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. The attack-and-defense contest
under Assumptions 1′, 2, 3, and 4 has a
continuum of equilibria. There may be mul-
tiple equilibria corresponding to the same
effort level of group 2, depending on which
players in group 1 are active. In equilib-
rium every player in group 2 exerts effort
0 < x2 ≤
(
v11v
2
2m2
)
∕
(
v11 + v2m2
)2
, the highest
valuation players in group 1 exert collective
effort of x1 =
(
v211v2m2
)
∕
(
v11 + v2m2
)2
, while
all other players in group 1 exert zero effort.
There may exist multiple coalition-proof
equilibria. All of them, however, induce the same
group efforts. In any coalition-proof equilibrium
the highest valuation players in group 1 exert
collective effort x1 =
(
v211v2m2
)
∕
(
v11 + v2m2
)2
,
each player in group 2 exerts effort x2 =(
v11v
2
2m2
)
∕
(
v11 + v2m2
)2
, and all other players
in group 1 put no effort.
Proof. Clearly, in any equilibrium, all players in
group 2 exert the same effort level x2 due to the
weakest link technology. Let I1 and I1H denote
the index sets of all players in group 1 and the
highest valuation players in group 1, respectively.
Fix player k∈ I1H , and suppose by contradiction
there exists a player j∈ I1\I1H whose equilibrium
effort level is x1j > 0. As before, denote by X1
equilibrium effort of group 1. Then the first-order
conditions imply
v1kx2∕
(
X1 + x2
)2 = 1,
v1jx2∕
(
X1 + x2
)2 = 1.
This leads to a contradiction as v1k > v1j.
Therefore, only the highest valuation play-
ers in group 1 exert a positive effort and
v1jx2/(X1 + x2)2 < 1 for all j∈ I1\I1H . The fol-
lowing system characterizes all equilibria (along
with x1j = 0 for all j∈ I1\I1H).
v11x2∕
(
X1 + x2
)2 = 1,
v2m2X1∕
(
X1 + x2
)2
≥ 1.
Therefore any strategy profile, such
that every player in group 2 exerts effort
0 < x2 ≤
(
v11v
2
2m2
)
∕
(
v11 + v2m2
)2
,
∑
i∈I1H
x1i =√
v11x2 − x2 and x1j = 0 for all j∈ I1\I1H in group
1, is an equilibrium. To derive coalition-proof
equilibria, one needs to solve the system
v11x2∕
(
X1 + x2
)2 = 1,
v2m2X1∕
(
X1 + x2
)2 = 1.
Note that all the coalition-proof equilibria
result in the same outcome with respect to the
group efforts:
(
v211v2m2
)
∕
(
v11 + v2m2
)2
and(
v11v
2
2m2
)
∕
(
v11 + v2m2
)2
in groups 1 and 2,
respectively. This completes the proof. ◽
Next, it may also be argued that instead of
following a weakest link IF, the defenders follow
an additive IF. To incorporate this, we retain all
the other assumptions from Section 2 unaltered,
but Assumption 2 is replaced with:
ASSUMPTION 2′. The group effort of group 2
is represented by the sum of effort levels exerted
by the players in group 2, that is, X2 =
m2∑
i=1
x2i.
Again, following the analysis in Theorem 2,
it is easy to show that only one player in group
1 is active in equilibrium. Multiple equilibria
exist, and the efforts depend on the identity of the
active player in group 1. Once again, similar to
Baik (2008), the equilibrium effort of group 2 is
unique. Only the highest value player(s) in group
2 exert positive effort and all other group mem-
bers exert zero effort. If there is more than one
player with the highest valuation, then the total
equilibrium effort of group 2 can be unambigu-
ously determined, but not the individual efforts.
This result is summarized in Theorem 5; the proof
is similar to the ones of Theorems 3 and 4.
Theorem 5. The attack-and-defense contest
under Assumptions 1, 2′, 3, and 4 has up to
m1 equilibria. In any equilibrium there is only
one active player in group 1. The condition
for only player k in group 1 to be active in
equilibrium is v1k ≥ v
2
11∕
(
v21 + v11
)
. If player
k in group 1 is active, then the highest valua-
tion players in group 2 exert collective effort
x2 =
(
v1kv
2
21
)
∕
(
v1k + v21
)2
, and player k in
group 1 exerts x1k =
(
v21kv21
)
∕
(
v1k + v21
)2
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while all other players from either group exert
zero effort. Coalition-proof equilibria are the
same as the Nash equilibria.
IV. DISCUSSION
We analyze a group contest in which one
group follows a best shot and the other group
follows a weakest link IF. This setting may be
viewed as a stylized representation of situations
in which one group attacks and the best effort
out of the groupmembers determines the strength
of the attack, whereas the other group defends
and the weakest effort among the group mem-
bers represents the strength of the defense. This
study adds to the attack-and-defense literature as
it introduces a group setting in this area of litera-
ture for the first time. It also introduces different
groups with different IFs in the group contest lit-
erature for the first time.
We fully characterize Nash and coalition-
proof equilibria and show that under symmetric
valuation, the game has a unique coalition-proof
equilibrium up to the permutation of the identity
of the active player in the attacker group. When
the valuations are asymmetric, a wider variety
of equilibria is possible. It is always an equilib-
rium for one of the highest valuation players to be
active, but it may also be possible that the active
player does not have the highest valuation. In any
equilibrium, only one player in the attacker group
is active, whereas all the players in the defender
group are active and exert the same effort. We
also characterize Nash and coalition-proof equi-
libria for the case in which one group follows a
perfectly substitute IF, whereas the other group
follows either a best shot or a weakest link IF. A
remarkable feature of the coalition-proof equilib-
ria is that the equilibrium effort levels are propor-
tional to the dispersion in valuation.
The results suggest that all the defenders (the
colluding firms or the terrorist group members),
due to the perfectly complementary nature of
their actions, participate in defense activity. How-
ever, they exert resources only according to the
strength of the weakest member of the group. If
the attackers (the antitrust or security authorities)
follow a perfectly substitute collective action,
then all the weaker or less efficient group mem-
bers free-ride on the strongest one. However, if
the collective action has the nature of a best shot,
and the valuation or efficiency of the strongest
group member is not too high, then other group
members may exert resources instead.
It can be shown that if one introduces budget
constraint as in Baik (2008), it does not affect par-
ticipation in the contest: only one player in group
1 is active, while all players in group 2 exert the
same effort (the details are available in theOnline
Appendix). This is in contrast with Baik (2008),
who finds that wider participation is possible
with budget constraints. There are several other
ways—both in theory and in application—to
extend the current analysis. First, it may be pos-
sible to employ a generic CES IF and vary the
elasticity of substitution across groups to achieve
a very general solution in this area of investiga-
tion. The analyses can be extended to more than
two groups and with the employment of more
than two IFs, a first attempt of which can be
observed in Lee and Song (2014). Finally, it is
also possible to test the theoretical predictions
and investigate whether any particular equilib-
rium is focal (Sheremeta 2011), or whether within
and across groups design tools such as pun-
ishment (Abbink et al. 2010) or communication
(Cason, Sheremeta, and Zhang 2012) affect sub-
ject behavior by implementing them in the labo-
ratory. However, each of these issues is beyond
the scope of this study and we leave them for
future research.
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